The Welfare Effects of Slum Improvement Programs: The Case of Mumbai
I. Introduction
Slums, which are characterized by substandard housing and inadequate water and sanitation facilities, are among the most pressing urban environmental problems in developing countries. Policies to improve the welfare of slum dwellers include upgrading slum housing in situ-for example, by providing piped water and sewage connections-and relocating slum dwellers to better quality, low cost housing.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the welfare effects of such programs using data for Mumbai (Bombay), India. A key issue in slum upgrading is whether current residents are made better off by improving housing in situ, or by relocating. The answer to this question depends on the tradeoffs people are willing to make between commuting costs, housing costs and the attributes of the housing that they consume. If, for example, a relocation program distances a worker from his job and, if finding a new job is difficult, in situ improvements in housing may dominate relocation programs. The utility of relocation programs also depends on neighborhood composition: if households depend on neighbors of the same caste or ethnic group for information about employment or for social services, relocation to neighborhoods of different ethnicity may be welfarereducing.
Evaluating the welfare effects of slum upgrading and resettlement programs requires estimating models of residential location choice, in which households trade off commuting costs against the cost and attributes of the housing they consume, including neighborhood attributes. We accomplish this using data for 5,000 households in Mumbai, a city in which 40% of the population lives in slums. A key feature of Mumbai that distinguishes it from other Third World cities is that many slums are centrally located, i.e., located near employment centers, rather than being relegated to the periphery of the city.
Slum relocation projects may therefore involve moving people to more remote locations.
We ask what corresponding improvements in housing and/or income would be necessary to offset the location change.
To answer these questions we estimate a model of residential location choice for households in Mumbai. The choice of residential location is modeled as a discrete choice problem in which each household's choice set consists of the chosen house plus a random sample of 99 houses from the subset of the 5,000 houses in our sample that the household can afford. Houses are described by a vector of housing characteristics and by the characteristics of the neighborhood within a 1 km radius of the house. Two important neighborhood characteristics are ethnic composition (the percent of one's neighbors of the same religion and same mother tongue) and employment accessibility. In one specification we treat the employment location of the primary household earner as fixed and characterize houses by their distance from the current work location. In an alternate specification we replace distance to the current workplace by an employment accessibility index, to capture opportunities for changing jobs.
We use the model of residential location to examine the welfare effects of specific programs-in situ improvements in housing attributes and the provision of basic public services, and a slum relocation program. Historically, both types of programs have been implemented in Mumbai (Mukhija 2001; Mukhija 2002 The economics literature on the benefits of slum improvements has, for the most part, consisted of hedonic studies that estimate the market value of various improvements, including tenure security and infrastructure services (Crane et al. 1997; Jimenez 1983 Jimenez , 1984 . Kaufman and Quigley (1987) advanced this literature by estimating the parameters of household utility functions rather than limiting the analysis to the hedonic price function. We extend this literature in three ways: first, we introduce employment access as a factor influencing the choice of residential location; secondly, we incorporate endogenous neighborhood amenities-in particular, the language and religion of one's neighbors-in residential location choice; thirdly, we account for unobserved heterogeneity in housing and neighborhood attributes, in the spirit of Bayer et al. (2004b) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in our empirical work and presents the stylized facts about where people live and work in Mumbai. Section 3 describes the model of residential location choice. Section 4 presents estimation results and section 5 the welfare effects of slum upgrading policies. Section 6 concludes.
1 http://mhada.bom.nic.in/html/web_VAMBAY.htm 3 II.
Job and Housing Locations in Mumbai
The target population of our study is households in the Greater Mumbai Region (GMR), which constitutes the core of the Mumbai metropolitan area. The GMR, with a population of 11.9 million people in 2001, is one of the most densely populated cities in the world. Located on the Arabian Sea, the GMR extends 42 km north to south and has a maximum width of 17 km. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai has divided the city into 6 zones (see Figure 1 ), each with distinctive characteristics. The southern tip of the city (zone 1) is the traditional city center. Zone 3 is a newly developed commercial and employment center, and zones 4, 5 and 6, each served by a different railway line, constitute the suburban area. In the remainder of this section we describe the distribution of population and jobs in the GMR, as well as the characteristics of the housing stock, based on a random sample of 5,000 households in Mumbai who were surveyed in the winter of 2003 (Baker et al. 2005 . however, "notified" squatter settlements have been registered by the city, and slum dwellers in these settlements are unlikely to be evicted. 4 Chawls, which house approximately 35% of sample households, are usually low-rise apartments with community toilets that, on average, have better amenities than slums. The remaining 25% of households live either in cooperative housing, which includes modern, high-rise apartments, in bungalows, or in employer-provided housing.
A. Distribution of Population and Housing
The spatial distribution of sample households by housing type is shown in Figures   2 and 3 , where each dot represents 5 households, and is summarized in as a consequence, slum dwellers may spend several hours commuting to work.
3 For example, Dharavi, the world's largest slum, was originally a fishing village located on swamp land. Slums began forming there in the late 19 th century when land was reclaimed for tanneries. Once on the periphery of Mumbai, Dharavi is now centrally located (in zone 2). 4 1.8 % of our sample households live in "non-notified" slums and 1.6 % in resettlement areas. The average tenure of households in notified squatter settlements suggests that squatters are unlikely to be evicted: 81% of households have been living in current location for more than 10 years while corresponding figure for the formal housing sector is 74%. 5 This is also true of the poor v. the non-poor. See Baker et al. (2005) Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 , based on data for 6,371 workers in our sample households, shows where people living in each zone work.
B. Distribution of Jobs and Commuting Patterns
6 Fifty-seven percent of workers in our sample households work in zones 1-3, 31% in the suburbs (zones 4-6), and 6% at home. The rest either do not work in a fixed location or work outside of the GMR. A striking feature of Table 4 is the high percent of workers who live in the same zone in which they work. This is highest in zones 1-3, but is substantial even in the suburbs. Replicating Table 4 for different income and occupational groups reveals that the diagonal elements in the table (the percent of people working and living in the same zone) are higher for workers in low-income than in high-income households, and are higher for unskilled and skilled laborers than for professionals (Baker et al. 2005, Tables 38 and D-1) . Figure 4 , which shows the distribution of one-way commute distances for workers in our sample is consistent with Table 4 : the median journey to work is less than 3 kilometers, although the distribution of commute distances has a long tail. The information presented here suggests that, on average, people in Mumbai live close to where they work: This is especially true for the poor, and also for laborers. This suggests that households may place a high premium on short commutes. If, in the short run, workers' job locations are fixed, slum upgrading programs that require households to move may reduce welfare if they move workers farther from their jobs. The impact of such programs on welfare will, however, also depend on the value attached to housing and neighborhood amenities.
III. Analytical Framework
The models of residential location choice we have estimated are descendants of discrete location choice models (e.g., McFadden 1978), but incorporate the recent literature on the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in discrete location choice models (Bayer et al. 2004b ). This section describes in detail the structure of these models and how they will be used to evaluate slum improvement programs.
A. Modeling Location Choice
We assume that the utility that household i receives from house h depends on a vector X h of house characteristics, a vector h Z of aggregate household characteristics of the neighborhood the house belongs to (e.g., ethnic composition) and on an index of employment accessibility for the principal earner in the household, E ih . Utility also depends on expenditure on all other goods, i.e., on income y i minus the user cost of housing, p h . Formally,
where
In (1) ξ h is a house specific constant that captures unobserved house and neighborhood characteristics that are perceived identically by all households; ε ih captures unobserved housing characteristics as perceived by household i. Equation (2) allows each element j of the β coefficient vectors to depend on the inner product of a vector of household characteristics, Z i , and a vector of coefficients α rj .
Estimation of the parameters of (1) and (2) will allow us to infer the rate of substitution between accessibility to work and housing cost, and accessibility to work and neighborhood and housing characteristics. To evaluate the welfare effect of moving household i from its chosen location to a new one, we compute the amount, CV, that must be added to the Hicksian bundle to keep the systematic part of the household's utility constant when it is moved.
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C. Estimation of the Model
In estimating the model of residential location choice each household's choice set consists of the chosen house plus a random sample of 99 houses from the subset of the 4,023 houses in our sample that the household can afford. 8 Because the housing attributes in our dataset are highly correlated, we use principal components of the attributes in estimating the parameters of equation (1).
Estimation of the parameters of (1) follows the two-step approach outlined in Bayer et al. (2004b) . Let δ h represent the portion of (1) 
In the second step, we search for the set of {δ h } that satisfy the maximization condition in equation (3), given our first-stage estimate of θ,
Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) show that for any θ the unique {δ h } that satisfy above conditions can be obtained by solving the contraction mapping
The {δ h } obtained in the second stage are used to re-estimate θ in step one. The procedure is iterated until our estimators converge. δ h is then regressed on X h to determine the coefficient vector α 0X .
IV. Estimation Results
A. Specification of the Utility Function
We assume that a household's utility from its residential location [eq. (1)] depends on housing and neighborhood characteristics. The first ten variables in Table 6 describe the house itself: whether the dwelling is a slum or a cooperative (chawl is the omitted category), whether it is a multi-story dwelling (flat), dummy variables to indicate the quality of the floor and roof, and the interior space in square feet. This is followed by a series of dummy variables indicating whether the house has a kitchen, a toilet, or a bathroom (i.e., a room for washing), and whether there is a piped water connection in the house. Due to the high correlation among these housing characteristics we replace them in empirical work by their first two principal components, which have eigenvalues greater than one. 10 We characterize the location of the house in terms of its distance from the nearest railroad track (whether it is < 300m from a track) and by the zone in which it is located.
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Neighborhood characteristics h Z include religion and mother tongue.
Specifically, we assume that utility is a function of the percent of households in the neighborhood that (a) are of the same religion as the household in question and (b) who speak the same mother tongue. 12 These variables should capture network externalities and other forms of social capital provided by neighbors of the same ethnic background. Table 6 indicates the degree of ethnic sorting in Mumbai: For example, while Muslim households comprise only 17% of the city's population, the average Muslin household in our sample lives in a neighborhood that is 35% Muslim. Although people from the state of Gujarat constitute only 12% of the population of Mumbai, the average household from Gujarat in our sample lives in a neighborhood that is 26% Gujarati. The extent of ethnic sorting is greater, in relative terms, for minority groups-e.g., for Sikhs, Christians, 10 The first two principal components explain approximately 60% of the variance in housing attributes. 11 The results in Tables 7 and 9 change little if zone dummies are replaced by section dummies. (There are 88 sections in Mumbai.) We report results using zone dummies for ease of interpretation. 12 Neighborhood characteristics are computed using sample households within 1 km of each house. A neighborhood contains, on average, 67 sample households, although the number varies depending on the population density of the area.
Buddhists, Tamils and Telugus-than for households in the majority (i.e., Hindus or households that speak Marathi or Hindi). For this reason we allow the coefficient on ethnic composition to vary with the percent of one's neighbors from the same background.
Employment access (E ih ) for the principal wage earner in the household is computed as follows. In Model 1, access is measured by the distance from house h to the worker's current job location. 13 The weight attached to distance from the current job location should capture the disutility of relocating in the short run, before the worker can change jobs. In Model 2, we replace distance to the current job from house h by the average distance from house h to the 100 nearest jobs in the worker's occupation, based on our survey data. We distinguish five occupations in computing the employment accessibility index: unskilled workers, skilled workers, sales and clerical workers, small business owners, and managers/professionals. This variable should capture the disutility of being moved away from desirable employment locations, even if the worker can change jobs.
Utility also depends on the log of monthly household income minus the cost of housing (i.e., the log of the Hicksian bundle). The Hicksian bundle is calculated as follows. All sample households were asked what "a dwelling like theirs" would rent for and what it would sell for. 14 We use the stated monthly market rent as the cost of the 13 The distance from house h to a worker's job is estimated as the distance between house h (whose location is geo-reference in the survey) and the approximate work location. The work location is approximated by the centroid of the intersection of the section and pin code in which the job is located. 14 We have used the answers to these questions to compute for each household the interest rate that would equate the purchase price of the house to the discounted present value of rental payments. The mean interest rate is 5.6% and the median 4.8%. Additional evidence that stated market rents are reliable is provided by using them to estimate an hedonic price function for housing in Mumbai. The housing and neighborhood characteristics in Table 6 , together with distance to the CBD, explain 64% of the variation in monthly rents in our sample. (See Table A1 .) dwelling. In calculating the income of households who currently own their home, we add to household income from earnings and other sources the monthly rent associated with the dwelling they own. For renters, household income is stated income from earnings and other sources. 15 The mean value of the Hicksian bundle, evaluated at the current residence, is 8,275 Rs. The median Hicksian bundle approximately 6,250 Rs. per month. Table 7 presents the results of estimating our models. The first column of the table presents estimates of the parameter vectors θ and α 0X . The parameter vector θ, which contains the coefficients of all variables that vary by household (i.e., the Hicksian bundle through measures of language and religion) is estimated in the first stage of the estimation procedure together with the set of house-specific constants {δ h }. In the second stage, the {δ h } are regressed on the principal components of housing characteristics, as well as the zone dummies and whether the house is within 300 m of a railroad track. The second column of the table presents the coefficients of the individual housing attributes, as well as the marginal value of each amenity, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between the amenity and the Hicksian bundle, evaluated at the median household income for our sample (6,250 Rs. per month).
B. Results
In both specifications all housing attributes are statistically significant at the 5% level. Other things equal, being in a chawl (the omitted housing category), is worth about 400 Rs. per month more than being in a slum, whereas being in a coop is worth about 700
Rs. more than being in a chawl. Being in a high-rise building (flat) is worth about 730 Rs. Rs. evaluated at a baseline of 5-10% but is worth only 13 Rs. in a neighborhood where 50-75% of households are already of the same religion.
These values are large, and may reflect various forms of network externalities. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2004) emphasize the importance of networks, formed along caste lines, in determining the jobs available to workers in Mumbai. These networks are especially important for laborers and unskilled workers. Similarly, in the United States, Bayer, Ross and Topa (2004) find significant evidence of informal hiring networks, based 16 When the distance of the second main earner's commute is included in the model, the value of a one km decrease in the second earner's commute is about 300 Rs. per month.
on the fact that individuals residing in the same block group are more likely to work together than those in nearby but not identical blocks.
In addition to providing employment networks, neighborhoods also serve as social capital to mitigate the effects of poverty. For example, social networks make possible the creation of spontaneous mechanisms of informal insurance and can improve the efficiency of public service delivery and/or of public social protection systems (Collier 1998 ).
We should, however, be cautious in interpreting these effects. In reality it is virtually impossible to disentangle the different reasons why similar individuals live in the same neighborhood. 17 Part of this sorting is indeed due to preferences. However, neighborhood composition could also be a result of imperfections in housing markets that segregate individuals to specific neighborhoods.
Other amenities that affect residential location are proximity to a railroad track as well as the zone dummies. Living next to a railroad track can be dangerous, in addition to providing visual disamenities: Approximately 6 people are killed each day crossing railroad tracks in Mumbai. The impact of zone dummies varies with the measure of employment access.
V. Evaluating Slum Improvement Programs
The set of policies that have been employed to improve the welfare of slum dwellers is diverse (Field and Kremer 2005, Mukhija 2001 ). Some projects have focused on providing secure tenure, on the grounds that this will provide an incentive for slum 17 Ethnic sorting does not appear to reflect the fact that people of the same religion or mother tongue have common educations and incomes. When we attempt to use income and education to explain variation in the exposure of households in minority groups to members of their group, F statistics are rarely significant. dwellers to invest in housing (Jimenez 1983 (Jimenez , 1984 Malpezzi and Mayo 1987 greater emphasis has been placed on providing incentives for community management and maintenance, including constructing or rehabilitating community centers, and on improving access to health care and education.
In this paper we focus on improving the physical aspect of slums by providing infrastructure services and improving housing quality. In Mumbai, virtually all slum dwellers have access to electricity; however, only half have piped water. Slum housing consists of small, dilapidated shacks with poor roofs. Programs to improve the physical quality of housing could involve in situ improvements or could involve housing reconstruction, either at the site of the original slum or in a location where bare land is available.
We evaluate stylized versions of both types of programs-in situ upgrading and relocation of slum households to better housing. We focus on slum households located in zone 5, specifically households in sections 79 and 80 who are located within one mile of the Harbor Railway. The characteristics of our sample households living in these slums appear in Table 8 . These households are, on average, much poorer than our sample as Table 8 To better understand the impacts of relocating, Table 9 presents the mean effects of different components of the slum upgrading program. For example, the mean benefit of the housing improvement associated with the program is 813 Rs. per month for households from section 79 (Distance to work model). Holding workplace location fixed, the mean disbenefit of being moved farther from the workplace is 290 Rs. per month, and the mean disbenefit of changing neighborhood composition 490 Rs. per month.
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Although the relocation program yields approximately equal housing benefits to both groups, and moves households away from railroad tracks, workers from section 79 are being moved much farther from their jobs than workers who originally lived in section 80.
(The latter, on average, actually benefit by being moved closer to their jobs.) The other major difference in welfare between the two groups comes from neighborhood effects.
Households who originally lived in section 79, who are primarily Marathi-speaking Hindus, are being moved into a neighborhood with a greater proportion of Muslim and Hindi-speaking households. They lose, on average, from the change in neighborhood composition. For households from section 79, the disbenefits of changes in commute distance and neighborhood composition actually wipe out the housing benefits of the slum improvement program, a result consistent with Kapoor et al. (2004) .
The impact of the relocation program however depends on the assumptions made about workplace location. When workplace location is held fixed, the households from section 79, who are on average being moved farther away from their jobs, are worse off than if they are able to change jobs: average welfare losses due to a longer commute go down when distance to work is replaced by the employment accessibility index (job access model). In the particular example illustrated in Table 9 , however, the welfare impact of allowing workers to change jobs is not large in quantitative terms. This is because the site of improved housing is not far away from section 79.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate more clearly the impact of changes in neighborhood composition and employment access on the benefits of slum improvement programs.
The figures plot the median CV associated with our sample improvement program, for all beneficiaries in Table 8 , as the location of the improved housing is moved to different places in the city. In Figure 7 we assume that the primary worker in the household maintains his current place of employment when the household relocates; in Figure 6 When each worker's job location is held fixed (Figure 7 ), the set of locations for the program that yield positive benefits (negative mean CV) is small indeed. The set of locations yielding positive benefits is much larger in Figure 6 , in which household utility depends on the employment access index. If potential participants in slum relocation programs look only at these programs from a short-run perspective (assuming that they cannot or will not change jobs), participation is likely to be much lower than if a longerrun perspective is taken.
VI. Conclusions
In the early Twentieth Century, slum improvement programs in many countries were equivalent to slum clearance-hardly a solution to the problem of lack of adequate housing in developing country cities. Beginning in the 1970's the strategy shifted to one of improving and consolidating existing housing-often by providing slum dwellers tenure security, combined with the materials needed to upgrade their housing or-in areas where land was plentiful-to build new housing. Emphasis on in situ improvements has continued to the present. These improvements may take the form of providing infrastructure services and other forms of physical capital, but also include efforts to foster community management, and access to health care and education. At the same time, some have called for replacing slums with multiple story housing either at the site of the original slum or in an alternate location.
In order to design successful slum improvement programs it is important to determine whether program benefits exceed program costs. It is also important, from the perspective of cost recovery, to determine household willingness to pay for specific program options. The early literature (Mayo and Gross 1987) focused on estimating the percent of income households were willing to spend on housing. This was followed by a literature that attempted to measure, using hedonic price functions, the market value of various improvements, including tenure security and infrastructure services (Crane et al. 1997; Jimenez 1984) . It is, however, difficult using the hedonic approach to value attributes that vary by household, such as distance to work, or the percent of neighbors similar to oneself. We believe that both sets of attributes are important in valuing slum improvement programs and have attempted to extend the literature by illustrating the value placed on these amenities by households in Mumbai.
We believe that the model estimated in this paper can be of use in calculating the relative welfare gains from alternative slum improvement programs. It is also useful in 20 predicting which households would be likely to participate in various programs, given costs of participation. In assessing the limited success of sites-and-services programs, Mayo and Gross (1987) No. of workers 
